In 1974 J. Maynard Smith introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in order to explain the evolution of genetically determined social behaviour within a single animal species. If the possible pure strategies for contests within a species are 1,2, . . ., ~1, and if A = (aij) is the payoff matrix, then aij is the payoff for the pure strategy i played against the pure strategy j; c aijqj is the payoff for the pure strategy i against the mixed strategy given by $ probability vector q = (ql, . . ., q,,); and In Taylor & Jonker (1978) the authors used the fact that the payoff, in animal contests, corresponds "by definition" to the rate of increase. This suggests for the investigation of the evolution of behaviour the dynamical model given by ~i/Xi = C aijxj. j With this equation, however, the strategies (xi, . . ., x,) don't remain on the simplex. But since only the differences in payoff are relevant for the game, one may consider Having derived this equation, Taylor & Jonker proceed to show, as their main result, that if p is an ESS satisfying a mild regularity condition, then p is an equilibrium state for (1) which is strictly stable (i.e. all eigenvalues have strictly negative real part). The converse is not valid.
In this note, we give a simple characterization of ESS which implies immediately that every ESS is an equilibrium state for (1) which is asymptotically stable (all orbits near p converge to p). Thus both the hypothesis and the result are slightly weaker than in Taylor & Jonker (1978) . We begin by reformulating Dl. D2: A state p E S, is called an ESS if for all 4 E S, one has provided s > 0 is sufficiently small.
The equivalence of the two definitions is easily seen since (2) means (l-&)(PAP-qAP)+&(PA4-qAq) > 0.
The interpretation of D2 is easy : if a mutation in a population with strategy p introduces a small population with strategy 4, then the p-population fares better than the q-population against the new (mixed) population (1 --~)p +~q. D2 then is equivalent to D3: A state p E S, is called an ESS if pAx > XAX for all x E S,, x # p, in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of p.
This follows by multiplying (2) by E and adding (1 -c)pA(( 1 -e)p + ~q) on both sides.
Let us now use the fact that p is the unique maximum of the function on S,, since the Lagrange multiplier must be equal to ap/ax, = P(Pi/Xi), which implies that the Xi must be proportional (and hence equal) to the pi, at the maximum. The time derivative of P along the orbits of (1) is p = T apI% . xi = P T pi(C UijXj-C xiaijxj) j i,j = P(pAx -XAX).
Hence D3 is equivalent to having P(x) > 0 for all x # p in a small neighbourhood of p. Thus D4: A state p E S, is an ESS if v=JJpqi-nx;i I I is a strict local Ljapunov function at p for (1). As a corollary of D4, one obtains that every ESS is asymptotically stable.
As an example, we mention that for the case of the "4hypercycle", where (with ki > 0) the unique equilibrium in the interior of S, is always globally stable; the function V is a Ljapunov function if all ki are equal, but it is never a strict Ljapunov function. For the "3-hypercycle", the equilibrium is again always a global attractor, but V is a (strict) Ljapunov function if the three constants A, Jk, and & satisfy the (strict) triangle inequality. These examples imply that not every asymptotically stable equilibrium is an ESS, and that (as noted already by Haigh in an appendix to Maynard Smith (1974) even for II = 3 there need not be an ESS at all. Another example is given by (which corresponds to the game of scissors-paper-stone which is treated by a different ecological model in May & Leonard (1975) . Here p = (l/3, l/3, l/3) and P = 0 on S, (every orbit in the interior is periodic).
Since there is nothing special about the Ljapunov function V, it could be that under certain circumstances it would be more appropriate to study asymptotically stable equilibria of (l), rather than ESS.
